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Addressing the Zeros Problem: Regression
Models for Outcomes with a Large
Proportion of Zeros, with an Application
to Trial Outcomes
Theodore Eisenberg, Thomas Eisenberg, Martin T. Wells, and Min Zhang*
In law-related and other social science contexts, researchers need to account for data with an
excess number of zeros. In addition, dollar damages in legal cases also often are skewed. This
article reviews various strategies for dealing with this data type. Tobit models are often
applied to deal with the excess number of zeros, but these are more appropriate in cases of
true censoring (e.g., when all negative values are recorded as zeros) and less appropriate
when zeros are in fact often observed as the amount awarded. Heckman selection models are
another methodology that is applied in this setting, yet they were developed for potential
outcomes rather than actual ones. Two-part models account for actual outcomes and avoid
the collinearity problems that often attend selection models. A two-part hierarchical model
is developed here that accounts for both the skewed, zero-inflated nature of damages data
and the fact that punitive damage awards may be correlated within case type, jurisdiction, or
time. Inference is conducted using a Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling scheme. Tobit
models, selection models, and two-part models are fit to two punitive damage awards data
sets and the results are compared. We illustrate that the nonsignificance of coefficients in a
selection model can be a consequence of collinearity, whereas that does not occur with
two-part models.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many legal system and other social science outcomes raise the question of how to model
phenomena with multiple zeros. Trial outcomes generally result in verdicts for plaintiffs or
defendants. A verdict for a plaintiff in an action involving money damages will lead to a
positive award. A verdict for a defendant will lead to a zero award. For some purposes, the
*Address correspondence to Martin T. Wells, email: mtwl@cornell.edu. Theodore Eisenberg was Henry Allen Mark
Professor, Cornell Law School and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University; Thomas Eisenberg is
a gradate student, Department of Economics, Cornell University; Wells is Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical
Sciences, Professor of Biostatistics and Epidemiology, Weill Medical College, and Elected Member of the Law Faculty,
Cornell University; Zhang is Associate Professor Department of Statistics, Purdtue University.
Earlier versions of this material were presented at the First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
University of Texas and the International Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, conducted by the Cegla Center for
Interdisciplinary Research of the Law, Tel Aviv University, Buchmann Faculty of Law.
161
162 Eisenberg et al.
mass of zeros represented by defendant victories need not be accounted for. The research
question of interest might be, conditional on plaintiff winning at trial, how much was
recovered? In that case, the zero-award outcomes representing defendant trial wins might
be ignored.
If, however, the researcher wished to include defendant wins in the analysis, ignoring
the zero-award outcomes would not be satisfactory. This might be the case if one were
computing the expected value of a possible lawsuit and wanted to account for both the
probability of winning and the amount of any monetary award if the plaintiff prevailed.
Similarly, if one were interested in the amount of punitive damages awarded to a plaintiff
who won at trial and received a punitive damages award, the cases with punitive damages
awards of zero could be excluded. But if one were interested in the expected punitive
damages recovery in cases won by plaintiffs, it would be necessary to include the cases in
which punitive damages awards were zero in cases won by plaintiffs.
Many empirical legal researchers realize that simple ordinary least squares methods
may be unsatisfactory in the presence of many observations for which the dependent
variable equals zero. Tobit models often are regarded as appropriate when data have a
lower boundary of zero to avoid possibly biased and inconsistent ordinary least squares
estimates (Tobin 1958). A common approach in the presence of many zero values is
therefore to use Tobit models, which account for censoring of the dependent variable (e.g.,
De Ruijter & Braat 2008; Fehr & Gdchter 2000; Hersch & Viscusi 2004). A possible problem
is that Tobit models do not account for the skewed, zero-inflated nature of damages data.
Tobit models assume censoring of the dependent variable rather than the dependent
variable often being observably equal to zero. This article reviews techniques for modeling
skewed damages awards in the presence of many zero values. This article develops a
two-part hierarchical model that accounts for the skewed, zero-inflated, and clustered
nature of damages data. It compares the results of the Tobit, selection, and two-part models
for two punitive damages data sets.
The underlying topics and statistical models that are discussed in this article have
appeared in various econometric and statistics literatures. Each of the models we discuss
below makes implicit distributional assumptions that need to be understood and vali-
dated. The goal of this article is to give an overview of the statistical models and issues
that face a legal researcher when analyzing data with many zeros. The rest of the article
is organized as follows. Section II reviews various models for analyzing data with a
large proportion of the continuous outcome variable being zero. Section III applies the
model to real data. We close the article with some discussion in Section IV and conclu-
sions. The Appendix gives R and OpenBugs code useful for fitting the two-part hierarchi-
cal model.
11. MODELS FOR ANALYZING A CONTINUOUS OUTCOME
VARIABLE WITH A LARGE PROPORTION OF ZEROS
In empirical legal literature and other social science literature, there have been misunder-
standings about the proper modeling of a continuous outcome variable with a large
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proportion of zeros. In this section we will discuss three classes of models and give some
recommendations about their relevance to modeling trial outcomes.
In some data sets we do not observe outcome values above or below a certain level,
due to a censoring or truncation mechanism. To model the relation between the observed
outcomes Y and a set of explanatory variables X, we consider a latent variable Y* that is
subject to censoring/truncation. We will consider models in which changes in X affect the
mean of Y only through the effect of X on the latent variable Y*. Truncation occurs when
some observations on both the dependent variable and regressors are lost, for example, if
punitive award level is the outcome variable and only cases with a punitive award are
included in the sample. In effect, truncation occurs when the sample data are drawn from
only a subset of a larger population. In the context of regression analysis, an outcome Yis
censored when we observe X for all observations, but we only know the true value of Y for
a restricted range of observations. Values of Yin a certain range are reported as a single
value or there is significant clustering around a value, say 0. For an uncensored Y, Y*, the
true value of Y when the censoring mechanism is not applied. We typically have all the
observations for I Y, X), but not { Y*, X}. Clearly, truncation entails a greater loss of infor-
mation than censoring.
Suppose the random (outcome) variable Y* has the normal distribution with mean
y and standard deviation a, that is, Y* - N(p, o). When a distribution is censored on the
left, observations with values at or below r are set to T,, that is:
Y=Y* if Y*> z
Y =,r, if Y* v. (1)
In this case, notice that P(censored)=P(Y*!rT)=(D and P(notcensored)=
P(Y* > T) = Gi(,U T) so that the mean of the censored variable Y equals:
E[Y] = P(not censored) xE[Y|Y > T]+ P(censored) x T
= D 9U++D l,(2)
where <p(.) and (D(.) are probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the
standard normal distribution, respectively. In the special case of C= Ty = 0, we have
E[Y]=[O p [ )]+ , where A(-) <p(-)/Q(-) is the inverse Mill's ratio.
The lognormal distribution is used to model continuous random quantities when the
distribution is believed to be skewed, such as certain awards and income variables. A
random variable Y is said to have the lognormal distribution with parameters p e R and
aE (0, -) if In(Y) has the normal distribution with mean p and standard deviation a.
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Equivalently, Y= ez where Z is normally distributed with mean p and standard deviation a.
If Y has the lognormal distribution with parameters p and a, then the mean and variance
of Yare:
E[Y]= exp +-Ia' and var(Y)= exp[2(p+C')]-exp(2p + a2) (3)
2 )
The moments of a truncated lognormal random variable equals E[YkIY>a]=
exp kp + 2 a 2{[k2 - (Ina - p)]/a}/D ((p - Ina)/a} for k> 0. This definition of a log-
normal random variable is in terms of the natural logarithm but other bases would lead to
the same family of distributions, with rescaled parameters.
An easy diagnostic to determine if a lognormal distribution is needed, say with awards
data, is to check if the mean award is well above the median award-if this is the case, there
is a suggestion of a right-skewed distribution. A kernel density estimate (or histogram) of
log awards can also be plotted and examined for approximate normality. Once the data
reveal approximate normality of the logged outcomes, the decision to use logarithms rather
than levels is clear-cut. A failure to plot the distributions of the levels and logs will likely lead
to flawed analysis. Eisenberg and Wells (2006) give a methodological primer on various
issues related to model selection for levels and logs in award data.
A. The Tobit Model
The standard Tobit model applies only if the underlying dependent variable contains
negative values that have empirical realizations censored to the value zero. However, the
Tobit model is routinely applied when the values of the observed dependent variable are
exclusively nonnegative and are clustered at zero, irrespective of whether censoring has
occurred.
In a probit model, the true outcome variable, Y*, is unobserved (latent); what is really
observed is an indicator variable, Y, which takes on the value of I if Y* is greater than zero,
and 0 otherwise. In contrast, Tobin (1958) devised what became known as the Tobit (i.e.,
Tobin's probit) or censored normal regression model for situations in which Yis observed for
values greater than zero but is censored (not observed) for values of zero or less. In the
standard Tobit model, the observed outcome Yis related to the latent variable Y* by the rule:
y*= X+ e, -iN(0,C2)
Y= Y* if Y> 0 (4)
= 0 if Y* < 0,
where X, is the collection of the independent variables, P is the vector of coefficients, and
the e;'s are assumed to be independently normally distributed. Therefore, in this model, Y/*
has normal distribution with mean P"X. and standard deviation a, that is, Y* - N(fTXi, 2).
Note that observed zeros of the outcome variable can mean either a true zero or censored
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data. For this data structure it is known that ordinary least squares estimators are biased
downward (Greene 2008). Maximum-likelihood estimation of P for the Tobit model is
straightforward and widely available in statistics packages.
To interpret the Tobit model's regression parameter estimates, the marginal effects
of the independent variables on some conditional mean function need to be examined. In
the ordinary least squares model Y = X + E;, e - N(0, o&), the conditional mean function
is E(YIX) = P'X and the marginal effect is aE(Y|X)/8x= 13, where x is the jth independent
variable. This makes interpretation clear-cut: A measures the marginal effect of the jth
independent variable on Y However, in the Tobit model, there are three different condi-
tional means: those of the latent variable Y*, the observed dependent variable Y, and the
uncensored observed dependent variable Yif Y> 0. Interpretation depends on the quantity
of interest. It can be shown using the properties of the truncated normal distribution in
Equation (2) that E[YIX] = (I X/or)[fX+ GA(P'X/a)] and E[Y|X Y>0] =E[Y|X]/
P(not censored) = E[YJX]/D(flX/a) = PfX+ GA(13'X/G) so that the corresponding mar-
ginal effects equal aE(Y|X)/ax1 = 03( (P3X/a), and aE(Y|X Y> 0)/3x= 1I - [A(-P'X/
U][A(-P'X/a) + 13aX/]}.
The development of the Tobit model depends on the normality assumption, which is
not appropriate for skewed award data. If the models are in the log form, rather than level,
that is, the conditional distribution of the latent variable Y* is now log normal with
parameters 3X and a. A primary benefit of the approaches discussed in the subsequent
sections is that they are a more natural way than Tobit to log transform the model.
The Tobit model posits that the outcome variable is censored at zero. If no censoring
has occurred, the standard Tobit specification is inappropriate. Maddala (1992:341) gives
a warning against using the Tobit model when no censoring has occurred: "Every time we
have some zero observations in the sample, it is tempting to use the Tobit model. However,
it is important to understand what the model really says. What we have is a situation where
Y* can, in principle, take on negative values. However, we do not observe them because of
censoring. Thus the zero values are due to nonobservability. This is not the case with
automobile expenditures, hours worked, or wages. These variables cannot, in principle,
assume negative values. The observed zero values are due not to censoring, but due to the
decisions of individuals." Consequently, if there has been no censoring, the Tobit model
may give a misspecified model and the likelihood function used to construct the estimates
is incorrect.
If there is no censoring and just the presence of zeros, the appropriate procedure
would be to model the phenomena that produce the zero observations rather than to use
a Tobit model. A debate over the propriety of using Tobit in corner-solution situations (as
opposed to true censored variable situations) exists. One could perhaps rationalize this
alternative view (Wooldridge 2010). One can view the latent variable as some decision
process metric-one uses some evaluation method to determine the amount of damages
that are worthy in this case. If the jury is very inclined to rule unfavorably, the scoring metric
may indeed be negative. Of course, negative damages are not possible, so they are indeed
set to zero. In other words, many of these situations where actual values are zero may still
be viewed as censored variables considering that the latent variable deals with a related but
different decision-making process.
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Tobit models have been applied in the empirical legal literature in the presence of
actual zeros. For example, in a study of punitive damages, Hersch and Viscusi (2004) state
that "[bjecause of the large number of zero values for punitive damages, we use tobit
regression." De Ruijter and Braat (2008) use a Tobit model with the dependent variables
equal to the number of hours of co-working, which are limited by zero but are not censored.
The models discussed in the next two subsections would provide more appropriate mod-
eling strategies for both the Hersch and Viscusi (2004) and De Ruijter and Braat (2008)
data analyses.
B. The Selection Model
The selection model has emerged as an alternative to Tobit when values cluster at zero due
to selection rather than censoring. Applications of the selection model have proven prob-
lematic as well. The Tobit model was formulated to deal with estimation bias associated with
censoring; the selection model (Heckman 1979) is a correction for selection bias, which
arises when interest centers on the relationship between Xand Ybut data are available only
for cases in which another variable exceeds a fixed certain value. The selection model,
which contains the Tobit model as a special case, was designed as a correction for selection
bias.
The selection model is governed by two equations. The first equation is a probit
model for the probability of having a positive outcome, and the second equation is a linear
model of the outcome among the subsample with Y> 0, that is:
Yi*o> = rXii+ E, i 2- N (0, 1)
Y*-fl X r,+E 2i e2,;N(0,a o) (5)
y= y*(2) if y*() > 0.
The explanatory variable sets X and X2 can be different subsets of X subject to some
identification conditions.
A key limitation to the Tobit model is that the probability of a positive value and the
actual value, given that it is positive, are determined by the same underlying regression
model. Both the selection model and the two-part model, discussed in the next subsection,
specify separate parts to their model, one accounting for the probability of a positive
outcome P[Y> OX] and the mean outcome conditional on Y> 0, E[ Y| Y> 0, X]. The
sample selection model was developed to estimate E[ Y*()IX]. However, if one is interested
in actual outcomes, the focus should be on E[ Y|XJ. It follows from Equation (2) and the
model in Equation (5) that for selection model:
E[YJY >0,X] = TX2 +pod2 A(aTXi). (6)
The inverse Mills ratio A(-) = <p()/4(-) is used to estimate the E[EIY>0, X] =
gq 22(a'XI), where term (Ei, E2) has a bivariate normal distribution with mean equal to (0,
0) and covariance matrix .:
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For the latent outcome y*(2), E[ Y*( 2)|X] = 0"X, and for the observed (actual) outcomes Y, it
follows that E[ YIX] = Q(aX,) [PiX2 + ga2e(aXj)] and E[ YX Y> 0] = PfX2 + QU2(aXj).
The corresponding marginal effects can be calculated via differentiation of these
expectations.
As with the Tobit model, the development of the selection model depends
on the normality assumption, which is not appropriate for skewed award data. If the
models are in the log form, rather than level, it is appropriate, that is, the conditional
distribution of the latent variable Y* is now log normal with parameters P'X and a. It
follows from Equation (3) and some properties of the log normal distribution that
E[YIX] = exp{PT X2 + a2r/2}'q(a'X + ga)}. The corresponding marginal effects can be
calculated via differentiation of these expectations.
The identification of the selection model can come from two different sources. The
first is to use X (the instruments) in the selection by imposing the exclusion restriction
assumption that some components of X have coefficients set equal to zero. However, such
exclusion assumptions are often untenable and are hard to defend, particularly in trial
outcome data models for which the determinants of zero awards are often the same as the
determinants of the amount of positive awards. In the absence of exclusion restrictions,
the second potential source of identification is functional form. Another issue facing the
selection model is that of multicollinearity since there is linear dependence between the
columns of Xand the inverse Mills coefficient. Since maximum-likelihood estimation is not
numerically stable and is computationally cumbersome in the selection model and the
estimates sometimes fails to converge, the Heckman (1979) two-step estimator is sometimes
used to fit the models (e.g., Bushway et al. 2007).
C. The Two-Part Model
In trial outcome data, the actual outcome is fully observed and is not a latent variable. Zero
values for damages indicate that zero dollars were awarded. If many observations have
zero damages, then the statistical challenge is to model these outcomes. As long as the zero
awards are true zeros and not missing data, there is no selection or censoring to address.
The two-part model is also governed by two equations. The first equation is a probit
estimator of the probability of having a positive outcome and the second equation is a linear
model of the outcome among the subsample with Y> 0, that is:
Y*() aTXi + i Eli- N(0, 1).
Y*| y*O) > 0 = pTX2, + E; e; N(0, a2)
y =y*) if *) > 0
Y, = 0 if Y*) < 0.
The covariate sets X, and X2 may or may not be different subsets of X This type of model
was introduced by Cragg (1971) as a more flexible alternative to the Tobit model.
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Sometimes called hurdle models, they allow the two outcomes to be determined by separate
processes. In the health economics literature (see Jones 1989), Y,*(l) is called the
participation equation and y = I[Y,*(l) > 0] x *( is the observed consumption (or award in
the legal context), where I[A] = 1 if the event A occurs and is zero otherwise.
There are two main ways in the literature to interpret the two-part model. The first is
to claim that it is not the unconditional, but the conditional expectation of Y that is of
interest to us. This approach is taken by Duan et al. (1983, 1984a, 1984b). The other
approach is to stress the behavioral structure of the model (Maddala 1985), to which the
selection process is central. In this case, selection and two-part models estimate the same
behavioral relation. However, the two-part model makes an implicit distributional assump-
tion for the unconditional distribution, which will be a mixing distribution, also depending
on the distribution driving the selection mechanism.
Notice that the selection equation is the same for both the selection model and
the two-part model; however, the conditional expectation, E[ Yi Y> 0, X] = PTX does
not involve the Mills ratio as in Equation (6). Also note that if g = 0, the selection and
two-part models are equivalent. However, recall that the two-part model is modeling
actual, not latent, outcomes. In the two part-model, the unconditional mean is
E[ YjX] = PT X24(aX) -
As with the Tobit and selection models, the development of the selection model
depends on the normality assumption, which is not appropriate for skewed award data. In
the case of models in logs rather than levels, E[YIX] = exp(X2 + o/2)@(a'Xj).
1. A Multilevel Two-Part Model
Multilevel data structures consist of data measured at multiple levels. For example, one may
have awards collected in distinct clusters (case type, locale, time). Data structured in this
way are implicitly "hierarchical" insofar as there is a clear nesting of "lower-level" units
within "higher-level" units. The natural hierarchy of this kind of data structure is why
models considered in this subsection are sometimes called hierarchical models. Multilevel
data structures need not be hierarchical (Gelman & Hill 2007), however.
In the context of skewed punitive award data, assume that the award data are
collected for M clusters (e.g., case type, locale, time). For i= , . . . , 1, M, and j= 1, ni,
let Z denote the observed punitive damage award for trial j within the ith cluster, Xj
represent a vector of trial-specific characteristics, and Wi be a vector of cluster (case type)
specific characteristics. With inflated zero values, the observed awards are assumed to
represent realizations of random variables whose probability distributions can be described
by a mixture of a point mass at zero and a continuous distribution. Since the nonzero award
data are always positive and heavily skewed to the right, they are modeled with a lognormal
distribution. That is, Zy = I(Y4(,' > 0) x exp(Y* 2 ), where Y*"o and y jea) represent two cor-
related latent random variables. Intuitively, Y.(') regulates when a zero award occurs and
y*12) is the natural logarithm of nonzero punitive damage awards.
A limitation of the two-part model described in the previous section is that it does
not explicitly model correlated errors between the two parts, and any omitted variable
introduces correlation. Zhang et al. (2006) proposed a two-part structure to model the
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dependence structure and hierarchical nature of the distributions of the two latent random
variables (') and Y(. Specifically:
()= a+blo+a T X1) + E, ei - N(0, 1),
= fl + bi4' + fl(fX2i + eLy, e2 ~ N(0, ul).
In the model above, the covariates Xij and X24 can be different subsets of X, representing
the observed characteristics of trial jwithin cluster type i. The ei and e2 i are assumed to be
independent, and the variance of Eiy is set to 1 for identifiability. Our assumptions imply the
conditional independence of Yii) and 1im(2) given bi. The random effects b1) and b,2)
regulate the zero award and the logarithm of a nonzero award, respectively. One can think
of b1) as representing the ith cluster type's tendency to award punitive damages at a trial
(or, in the context of assessing compensatory damages, to find for plaintiff at trial) and b42)
as representing the ith cluster's inclination to award high punitive damages (or to award
compensatory damages). Treating b) and b, 2) as having some probability distribution is
what Gelman and Hill (2007) call a "soft constraint" variability; the mean effect is estimated,
but is assumed to have some random variability around it. This variability is attributable to
unmeasured factors.
The latent variables (" and (2) are linked together by the correlated random effects
b,1) and b2), specifically:
~) N (( ,V
where Wi; and W2, are the case-type-level characteristics; V2. 2 is assumed to be positive
definite with the off-diagonal being allowed to be nonzero. The normality assumption on
b) and b42) is standard in random effects modeling (Gelman & Hill 2007).
This two-part hierarchical model is composed of a hierarchical probit model and a
hierarchical linear regression model. It is similar to that obtained by Olsen and Schafer
(2001), who used a logit model for the binary part and considered the case where longi-
tudinal observations were available on the same subject. The Appendix gives R and
OpenBugs code useful for fitting the two-part hierarchical model.
D. Model Selection
In choosing between the models one has to address the conceptual issue of what one is
trying to model. The choice between the Tobit, selection, and two-part models revolves
around whether we wish to model censored, latent, or observed outcomes (Dow & Norton
2003; Puhani 2000). In the context of damage awards with observed zero awards, there is no
censoring or latent structure. One is modeling actual fully observed awards, in which case
the two-part model is more appropriate. Given that there is no censoring for the observed
trial outcome data, the Tobit model should not be applied for award data.
In fully observed outcomes, zero values for damages indicate that zero dollars were
awarded. In contrast, a latent outcome is a latent variable that is only partially observed. The
observed zeros do not necessarily represent zero values in the latent outcome setting. If
the zero damages are true zeros, there is no selection problem to address and no latent
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outcomes. Selection models can be used to estimate actual outcomes; however, they require
extra calculations beyond what is reported in statistical packages. In Heckman's original
applications, the focus was on the effect of education on wages. In the selection setting, one
only has access to wage data for those who work and does not observe the wage for people
who do not work, who will likely be those people only able to achieve a relatively low wage
given their education. Since people who choose to work are selected nonrandomly from the
population, estimating the determinants of wages from the subpopulation who choose to
work introduces bias. In this setting, one may be interested in modeling the potential wages
an individual could earn if he or she chooses to work. In this way one can then estimate the
effect of a covariate such as education on both the fully observed and potential workers
(Dow & Norton 2003). In the context of damages with observed zero awards, there is no
latent positive expected award that might have been observed.
Using maximum-likelihood estimation for fitting selection models can lead to
numerical problems since the likelihood is not necessarily globally concave in g. Therefore,
there may be convergence issues since the maximization algorithm may not find the global
maximum. An alternative to maximum-likelihood estimation is a two-step estimation
method. In the first step, the selection equation is estimated using a probit and the inverse
Mills ratio is then estimated for each case. The second step is an ordinary least squares
regression with X and the inverse Mills ratio included as regressors. We will see in the
examples below that the two-step estimation method can be problematic. Bushway et al.
(2007) give a nice discussion of the issues related to two-step estimation for selection
models in the context of criminological research.
Another issue in the choice between the selection and two-part models is that X, and
X2 often have a large set of covariates in common and perhaps are even identical. The
exclusion restrictions in the selection model are rarely if ever valid in trial outcome models.
There are no exclusion restrictions if no variables that are in X2 are excluded from X1 .
Collinearity problems are inevitable since the Mills ratio is approximately linear over a wide
range of its argument. The multicollinearity issue for the selection models has been
investigated in some detail by Leung and Yu (1996) and Puhani (2000). They show, via
some convincing simulation evidence, that the collinearity between the regressors in X, and
the inverse Mills ratio (as a function of X2) is critical in terms of choosing between the
sample selection and two-part models. If the condition number exceeds 20, then the
two-part model is more robust and should be used. A number of methods for detecting
multicollinearity are outlined in Anderson and Wells (2008). The usual rule of thumb in
practice is that a variance inflation factor (VIF) 4 suggests that collinearity is a problem;
some authors use the more lenient cutoff of VIF 5. There are no identification issues for
the two-part model as in the selection model; consequently, there is no multicollinearity
issue as in the selection model.
III. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We apply the two-part hierarchical model and relevant comparison models, including Tobit
and selection models, to two data sets. The first consists of awards in 1980s and 1990s sexual
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harassment cases that led to reported opinions, the data used by Sharkey (2006), described
below. The second consists of awards in 2005 in state court trials terminated in 46 large U.S.
counties. The data come from the CivilJustice Survey of State Courts, a National Center for
State Courts-Bureau ofJustice Statistics project.
A. The Data
1. The Sharkey Sexual Harassment Data
Sharkey (2006) augmented a Sunstein and Shih (2004) data set that consisted of 70
reported cases, decided from 1983 to 1997. Of the 70 cases, 56 included a positive noneco-
nomic compensatory damages amount, and 40 included a positive punitive damages
amount. The cases are listed in Sunstein and Shih (2004). Sunstein and Shih claim that
their sample included all reported cases (from 1982 until February 1998) in which juries
awarded damages in sexual harassment cases. Sunstein and Shih limited their sample to:
(1) cases between plaintiff employee(s) and defendant employer(s)/supervisors/co-
employees (i.e., excluding cases brought by the EEOC on behalf of employees); (2) cases
raising at least one claim of sexual harassment under either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 or state civil rights laws; (3) cases involving trial by jury; and (4) cases in which the
jury awarded some positive amount of damages on the basis of sexual harassment. Professor
Sharkey generously furnished us an expanded data set from February 1998 (where the
Sunstein and Shih ends) to May 2004.
The total sample size, including all reported plaintiff win cases from 1983 until 2004,
consists of 232 cases. Of these, 203 had nonzero, nonmissing information about the
compensatory award. Of the 232 cases, 146 had a nonzero punitive award. The cases with
compensatory award information included 116 with information about punitive awards.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our models.
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the distribution of the punitive awards, which
include 86 cases with no punitive award, and uses a logarithimic transformaton for nonzero
awards. The Sharkey data are precisely the type of data discussed above, that is, logarith-
mically transformed trial outcomes with a large proportion of zeros. The second graph in
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the punitive and compensatory awards, both logarithmically
transformed, for the 115 cases with positive punitive and compensatory awards and a
compensatory award of at least $100. The correlation coefficient for the two awards is 0.31,
significant at p < 0.001.
Sharkey (2006) included factors that might be associated with the nature and severity
of harassment: propositions by the harasser; visual display of pornography or body parts;
coerced sex; verbal abuse; any unwanted physical contact; other evidence of a pattern of
behavior; and whether plaintiff is alleged to have participated in the harassment, including
situations where the plaintiff has engaged in consensual sexual relations with the defend-
ant. Sharkey also coded the number of defendants according to how many defendants were
ordered to pay damages to the plaintiff, variables pertaining to the damages limitations of
Title VII (whether the harassing activity took place on or after November 21, 1991, the
relevant effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991), and whether the outcome was
reversed on appeal.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Regression Models ofJury Punitive Damages
Awards, Sexual Harassment Cases, 1983-2004
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Compensatory award 208 270,824.5 462,125.4 0 3,120,000
Punitive award 207 760,993.0 4,444,685.0 0 6.15e + 07
Behavior pattern involving others 191 0.30 0.46 0 1
Behavior pattern involving plaintiff 193 0.68 0.47 0 1
Coerced sex 189 0.05 0.22 0 1
Employment effects 216 0.69 0.47 0 1
Multiple harassers 193 0.26 0.44 0 1
Physical contact 190 0.68 0.47 0 1
Plaintiff participated 191 0.05 0.21 0 1
Proposition 191 0.47 0.50 0 1
Quid pro quo 221 0.16 0.37 0 1
Reversed 232 0.27 0.45 0 1
State ranking index 230 9.97 7.35 1 23
Verbal abuse 190 0.84 0.37 0 1
Visual (picture or gesture) 190 0.17 0.38 0 1
Year 232 1,998.0 4.13 1983 2004
1991 Act 232 0.78 0.42 0 1
NOTE: The sample consists of sexual harassment cases, available on Westlaw and decided from 1983 through May
2004, in which juries awarded damages to plaintiffs.
Sharkey also coded variables for quid pro quo harassment and effect on employment.
Employment effects include three subcategories: fired, quit, and other negative effects
short of firing (including unwanted transfers and retaliatory hostility from co-workers).
One would expect much overlap between the variables for quid pro quo and employment
effects. Both the Sharkey and Sunstein and Shih studies attempt to control for time
differences by including indicator variables for the trial year. The trial year is either
reported in the decision or, if not, they coded the trial year as one year prior to the reported
appellate decision (or else the same year as a trial court opinion).
Sunstein and Shih had difficulty controlling for state effects given their small sample.
Because their data sets were too small to use state dummy variables, both Sunstein and Shih
and Sharkey included a proxy for state fixed effects, a ranking of state product liability
punitive damages awards, derived from data on product liability cases. The ranking variable
is based on the percentage of product liability cases in which punitive damages are awarded
(Sharkey 2006:21).
Sharkey's empirical study used standard ordinary least squares regression models
with a logged dependent variable since the distribution of the nonlogged variables for
damages was right-skewed. Sunstein and Shih ran Tobit models to take into account zero
values (which are excluded by a logged OLS dependent variable).
2. The Civil Justice Survey Data
The CivilJustice Survey data for 2005 included 46 of the 75 most populous counties and 110
other counties to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not included in the country's 75
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Figure 1: The histogram shows the distribution of punitive awards in 202 sexual harass-
ment cases, available on Westlaw and decided from 1983 through May 2004, in which juries
awarded compensatory damages to plaintiffs. The scatterplot shows the relation between
punitive and compensatory awards in 115 cases with both types of awards. All damages
amounts are adjusted for inflation, in 2004 dollars.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Regression Models of Punitive Damages
Awards, State Court Trials, 2005
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Compensatory award 342 1,573,830 7,362,256 0 80,100,000
Punitive award 130 2,814,046 11,300,000 0 115,000,000
Motor vehicle tort 353 0.10 0.30 0 1
Intentional tort 353 0.10 0.30 0 1
Fraud 353 0.20 0.40 0 1
Buyer plaintiff (contract) 353 0.10 0.30 0 1
Employment-other 353 0.06 0.24 0 1
Other 353 0.44 0.50 0 1
NOTE: The sample consists of state court trials in large counties, concluded in 2005, in which punitive damages were
sought.
largest counties (Bureau ofJustice Statistics 2008). The data included all trials completed in
the studied counties in 2005 and included a variable that reported whether punitive damages
had been sought in each case. The 2005 data include 8,872 trials of an estimated total of
27,128 in state courts in the United States in 2005, or 32.7 percent. Based on the sample
design, the trials from the 46 counties are estimated to represent 10,813 general bench and
civil trials disposed of in the nation's 75 most populous counties. Evidence of heterogeneity
in award patterns exists as between the large and small counties (Eisenberg et al. 2010). We
limit our analysis here to the small fraction of cases, 342 trials in the large counties, in which
punitive damages were sought and there was a nonzero compensatory award. Information
about whether punitive damages were sought was not available in the Sharkey data.
Of these 342 trials seeking punitive damages, 130 (37.4 percent) resulted in a
punitive award. The Civil Justice Survey data do not have the richer detail about cases
contained in the opinions in the Sharkey data. They do include information about the kind
of case or the locale of the case. Prior models using these data include selection models of
whether punitive damages were awarded (Eisenberg et al. 2010), but not of the amount of
a punitive award, conditional on a punitive award being sought. Table 2 reports descriptive
statistics for the variables used in our models.
The histogram in Figure 2 shows the distribution of the punitive awards, which
include 208 cases with no punitive award, and uses a logarithmic transformation for
nonzero awards. Like the Sharkey data, the data have a large proportion of zeros. The
second graph in Figure 2 is a scatterplot of the punitive and compensatory awards, both
logarithmically transformed, for the 130 cases with positive punitive and compensatory
awards. The correlation coefficient for the two awards is 0.80, significant at p < 0.001. Note
that the Civil Justice Survey data, not biased by the filtering leading to available opinions in
the Sharkey data, show a much higher fraction of zero punitive awards and a much stronger
correlation between the punitive and compensatory awards.
B. Model Estimation
The Tobit and selection models were performed using Stata version 13 (StataCorp) with
robust standard errors clustered by time in the Sharkey data and by state in the Civil Justice
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Figure 2: The histogram shows the distribution of punitive awards in 342 state court trial
outcomes from the 2005 CivilJustice Survey in which compensatory damages were awarded
to plaintiffs. The scatterplot shows the relation between punitive and compensatory awards
in 135 cases with both types of awards.
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Survey data to correct the variance estimates due to the presence of conditional depend-
ence from the multiple cases with the cluster. In the case the data are not clustered, the
two-part model can be fit using one regression at a time because of the separability of
the likelihood function. In the case of clustered data (time in the Sharkey data and state in
the CivilJustice Survey data), we use the Bayesian approach outlined in Zhang et al. (2006)
to fit the two-part model with a cluster-specific random intercept. The Bayesian approach to
two-part modeling has certain advantages over non-Bayesian approaches. In principle, all
prior distributions we use are specified to be as noninformative as possible. A normal
distribution, N(0, 106), was chosen for the regression model parameters, that is, as and Ps,
and an inverse Gamma (1, 10-') prior was chosen for the variance parameter o2; see
Speckman and Sun (2003) for details regarding the propriety of the corresponding
posteriors.
Selecting a prior for the covariance matrix V turned out to be a more challenging
problem. The conjugate prior, inverse Wishart (1928), is commonly used in practice.
However, the inverse Wishart prior has a tendency to force the eigenvalues of the covari-
ance matrix apart (Yang & Berger 1994). The results of Yang and Berger suggest that the
reference prior should outperform Jeffreys (1946) prior, to which the inverse Wishart prior
is approximately equal, due to the tendency of the latter to spread out the eigenvalues.
Because of the hidden undesirable features of the inverse Wishart priors, we experimented
with various other priors (Daniels & Pourahmadi 2002).
The reference prior ofYang and Berger (1994), being improper,' avoids the problem
of placing significant probability mass on covariance matrices with diffuse eigenstructures.
However, WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al. 2000) requires the use of proper prior distribu-
tions. We will use an approximation of the Yang and Berger reference prior. The covariance
matrix can be expressed as:
= max (d,t1,2)- 6y2  min5,f)+yj 8
-SyV min(d,ds+y
where both d, and 4 are positive, 3= Id, - d|, and ye (-1, 1). Our approximate reference
prior is obtained by assuming y-Uniform(-1, 1) and that d, and d, are independent
Gamma(0.5, 100) random variables. This prior, "informative" in the sense that the prior
means and variances of the components of Vare all finite, is used in the data analysis of the
next subsection.
The posterior distributions of a, 8, o, V, and {b; : i= 1, . . . given the observed
data are very complicated and neither amenable to analytical calculation nor direct Monte
Carlo sampling so Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are used to approximate
the posterior distributions. Initial values were set to 1,000 for variance and 0 for
nonvariance parameters. Priors are specified according to the previous discussion. Conver-
gence of the MCMC sampling scheme was assessed using both empirical (Gelfand & Smith
'if the integral of the prior values is infinite but still yields sensible answers for the posterior probabilities, the prior
is called an "improper" prior.
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1990) and test-based approaches (Cowles & Carlin 1996). Results from convergence diag-
nostics indicated that it was sufficient to burn in the first 10,000 samples and take the
following 10,000 samples for inference.
C. Results
Tables 3 and 4 report results of the models discussed for the sex discrimination data and the
Civil Justice Survey data, respectively. The tables illustrate important methodological issues
for the various models.
1. Results for the Sharkey Sexual Harassment Data
In Table 3, the Tobit, OLS (fe), and selection regressions control for fixed trial year effects
by including indicator trial year variables. None of the coefficients on the trial year dummy
variables was significant at p 0.05. The two-part model uses a trial year random effect as
the cluster variable, as did Sharkey in her analysis of the data. The Tobit model in Column
1 includes cases with a punitive award of zero. The OLS regressions in Columns 3 and 4 are
limited to cases with nonzero punitive awards. The two-part and selection models jointly
estimate the probability of a positive award and the level of the award. The mean award
amount models in Columns 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 use logged values for punitive damages
(dependent variable) and compensatory damages (independent variable). The existence of
award results shown in Column 7 is the same for both Heckman models so we report the
Heckman existence equation results only once.
Sunstein and Shih ran Tobit models to account for zero values and did not find a
positive relationship between the size of compensatory and punitive damages. However, the
histogram in Figure 1 indicates that the Tobit model in the untransformed award scale does
not provide a good fit for the data. Using an OLS methodology for log transformed positive
awards, Sharkey (2006) finds a consistently (strongly statistically significant) positive rela-
tionship between the size of compensatory and punitive damages. But the OLS model
reported excluded cases with no punitive damages award. The Heckman models and the
two-part model provide some reconciliation of the Tobit and OLS approaches. They allow
inclusion in the model of the cases with zero punitive awards but do not questionably treat
the zero awards as censored.
With respect to the relation between compensatory awards and the amounts of
punitive awards in cases with punitive awards, the second Heckman model (Column 9 of
Table 3) and the two-part model yield results similar to the OLS model. These models
suggest a positive association between compensatory and punitive awards, while also
accounting for zero-award cases, which the OLS model does not include. Note that the
marginal significance in the OLS model differs from Sharkey's larger and more significant
coefficient (/3= 0.297; p < 0.001). The fixed effect year variables used here differ from the
clustering on year reported by Sharkey. The multiple dummy variables resulted in some
evidence of multicollinearity, with an average VIF of 6.66 in the OLS model. Two outlying
observations also affected the model; with their exclusion, even a model with year fixed
effects yields significant results, as does quantile regression even with the outlying observa-
tions. The utterly insignificant relation between the compensatory and punitive awards in
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the Tobit model, as also reported in models used by Sunstein and Shih and Sharkey, is due
to the dominance of zero awards in the Tobit model.
Two Heckman models are reported to illustrate the importance of collinearity for
such models when estimated using the Heckman two-step method (the method used in the
Heckman models in Table 3). In the case of the Sharkey data, only the two-step procedure
was available because a maximum-likelihood model with fixed effects for years failed to
converge. The first selection model is just identified via an exclusion restriction. However,
as pointed out above, the selection and mean models may have a large set of common
covariates (and perhaps are even identical). Collinearity problems are inevitable since the
Mills ratio is approximately linear over a wide range of its argument. Leung and Yu (1996)
suggest if variance inflation factors are too large, the two-part model is more robust and
should be used. Computing the VIF in the first selection model (Column 8 of Table 3), we
find VIF(MILLS RATIO) = 59.23, VIF(VERBAL ABUSE) = 18.88, VIF(cOERCED SEX) = 18.38,
VIF(REVERSED) = 16.50, VIF(STATE RANKING) = 9.75, and VIF(PROPOSITION) = 8.88. Hence
the nonsignificance of many coefficients in the first selection model is a consequence of the
collinearity problem. Removing the VERBAL ABUSE, COERCED SEX, REVERSED, and STATE
RANKING explanatory variables from the first selection model we see that the results of
the second selection model (Column 5) are much more similar to the two-part model. In
the second selection model, the largest variance inflation factor is now VIF(MILLS
RATIO) = 2.50; consequently, collinearity is no longer an issue. These problems lead to the
two-step procedure being essentially useful in modeling the Sharkey data, and yield results
that are consistent with all other models. There are no identification restrictions for the
two-part model as in the selection model; consequently, there is no multicollinearity issue
as in the selection model.
The useful Heckman model (Column 8 of Table 3) and the two-part model each
show a statistically significant, positive relation between the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
variable and punitive damages award amounts. This is to be expected because that Act
authorized punitive damage awards in some new categories of Title VII cases. The Tobit
model in levels has a insignificant coefficient for this variable, suggesting its inconsistency
with the models that are better suited to the data.
In general, the Tobit model is similar in result to the probit models and the existence
portions of the Heckman and two-part models. They each yield small, insignificant CoM-
PENSATORY AWARD coefficients. They each yield statistically significant or near-significant
COERCED SEX, REVERSED, and VERBAL ABUSE coefficients. The significance of the COERCED
SEX, VERBAL ABUSE, and REVERSED variables in the Tobit model is clearly due to the
confounding of the significance of those variables in the probability of a punitive award.
However, the Tobit model is inadequate in capturing the relation between any variables
and the level of a nonzero award; the dominance of zero values in the dependent variable
drives the results. Models that account for the existence of nonzero awards and their level
are superior.
Sunstein and Shih are quite emphatic about the robustness of their Tobit regression
results: "No matter what method, regression, or data set is used, higher compensatory
awards do not produce higher punitive damages." The Sunstein and Shih results seem to
depend on the extreme influence of a handful of observations and are confounded by the
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variables that significantly predict nonzero awards. In terms of the log transformed models,
a statistically significant relation between punitive (log) and compensatory (log) awards is
evident. This relation is consistent with the mass of punitive damages studies (e.g.,
Eisenberg et al. 2006).
Our goal in analyzing the Sharkey data is not to produce the best model. In part, we
sought to maintain continuity with the Sunstein and Shih and Sharkey analyses. Further
refinement of the models might include accounting for correlations among the group of
explanatory variables. For example, about 60 percent of the cases jointly had, or did not
have, both a quid pro quo and a proposition in their facts. But these subtleties have little
impact on the core research question of whether punitive and compensatory damages are
significantly associated, as suggested by Figure 1.
2. Results for the Civil Justice Survey Data
Table 4 reports results for punitive damages awards in the Civil Justice Survey data for 2005.
The models for existence of punitive damages for the Civil Justice Survey data show a
significant relation between the amount of the compensatory award and the existence of a
punitive award. None of the existence models for the Sharkey data show that relation. This
may be because the Civil Justice Survey data have information about all trials in which
punitive damages were requested. The Sharkey data have been filtered by decisions to
report results in opinions and decision to appeal, which may yield less useful estimates of
this relation.
As with the Sharkey data example, the two Heckman models are reported to illustrate
the importance of collinearity using the Heckman two-step method. In the case of the Civil
Justice Survey data, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 give the maximum-likelihood estimates and
two-step estimates, respectively. Computing the VIF for the two-step method (Column 8),
we find the VIF(MILLS RATIO) = 142.34, VIF(LOG COMPENSATORY DAMAGES) = 95.39, and
VIF(INTENTIONAL TORT) = 52.83. Hence the nonsignificance of all the coefficients in the
two-step selection model is likely a consequence of the collinearity problem. The maximum-
likelihood estimates for the selection model (Column 7) are much more similar to the
two-part model (Column 5).
All the models agree on the strong log punitive and log compensatory association.
The maximum-likelihood estimates for the Heckman model (Column 7 of Table 4) and the
two-part model (Column 5) agree on the significance and nonsignificance for EMPLOYMENT
and INTENTIONAL TORT, respectively, whereas the Tobit model flips the significance. The
agreement between the two-part, maximum-likelihood selection, and the separate models
in these data is likely because of lack of dependence between the selection and level error
terms (p= 0.16 for testing; g = 0 in the selection model).
IV. DISCusSION AND CONCLUSION
The two-part model is suitable for modeling data with many observed zero damage awards;
however, use of the two-part model is not a substitute for careful thought about the nature
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of the data. When zeros are not actually observed, the two-part model is not applicable. For
example, the two-part model suits modeling the compensatory or total damages award in
cases in which victories for defendants can reasonably be regarded as awards of zero
compensatory damages. Similarly, in cases in which plaintiffs win and properly seek puni-
tive damages, models of punitive damages in cases won by plaintiffs may reasonably treat the
cases without punitive damages as punitive awards of zero.
But in cases in which it is unknown whether plaintiffs sought punitive damages, the
award of punitive damages often is not actually observed. The absence of a punitive award
may not be an actual zero award but may merely reflect that punitive damages were not
sought. Use of the two-part model, or other models of the existence of a punitive award,
absent information about whether punitive damages were sought may be inappropriate. In
the case of Title VII actions, where the vast majority of cases involve claims of intentional
discrimination (Nielsen et al. 2010:192), it seems reasonable to assume that punitive
damages were sought, but our numerical results are subject to that assumption. Evidence
exists that punitive damages are sought less frequently than is widely believed (Eisenberg
et al. 2010).
The models discussed in this article all involve important assumptions in addition to
those about the observability of zero awards. The assumptions include the normality of
random effects and error terms, the linear relationship between probit-probability and
covariates for modeling the probability of having positive awards, and the linear relation-
ship between log-award and covariates. We also evaluated the impact of our model assump-
tions in other ways. For example, separately fitting a generalized linear mixed model to the
binary portion and a linear mixed model to the continuous part indicated that the corre-
sponding estimates were quite close to the posterior means reported in Table 3. We
obtained similar Bayesian estimates using a logit rather than probit link. The use of various
Gamma and inverse Gamma prior distributions for variance parameters are robust and
have very little effect on the posteriors. We evaluated the sensitivity of the results for both
"noninformative" and "informative" versions of our priors and the results were rather
insensitive to the choice of prior family.
Although it has been known that Tobit models are questionable in the case of data
containing many actually observed zeros, the use of Tobit models in that context remains
common. The Tobit results reported here fail to capture important features of the data and
completely miss the strong association between punitive and compensatory awards in cases
with punitive awards. The two-part model presented here allows researchers who wish to
model case outcome data or other social science data with many zeros to do so without
having to rely inappropriately on Tobit models. A statistical contribution of this article is the
introduction of the Bayesian version of a two-stage hierarchical model by Zhang et al.
(2006) that is able to deal with the clustered and highly skewed nature of damage award
data.
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APPENDIX: CODE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY DATA-
Two-PART MODELS
To illustrate the methodology behind our Bayesian two-part models, the R and OpenBUGS
code are displayed in this section. Methods for Bayesian analysis in Slata using WinBUGS can
be found in Thompson et al. (2006). For reference in the CivilJustice Survey data, param-
eters that begin with "alpha" are from the selection component and those that begin with
"beta" are from the amount component. The variable numbering is as follows: x refers to
the natural logarithm of the compensatory award, x2 is the motor vehicle tort dummy, x3
is for intentional torts, x4 represents fraud, x5 represents "buyer plaintiff (contract)," and
x6 is "employment-other." Parameters denoted with 0 are constants. Below is the
OpenBUGS code that can be used in a R workspace environment:
#N - total number of observations
#M - number of sites
#load the data, resulting data frame is called pd_342
setwd("...")
y<-pd_342$y
xl<-pd_342$xl
x2<-pd_342$x2
x3<-pd342$x3
x4<-pd342$x4
ID<-pd_342$id
x6<-pd_342$x6
x5<-pd342$x5
N<-342
M<-25
pd342jata<-list ("M", "N", "lD", "y", "xl", "x2", "x3", "x4", "x5", "x6")
# Initial Values
inits <- function( ) (list (alphaO = -0.5, alphal = 0.2, alpha2 = -0.1, alpha3= 0, alpha4= 0,
alpha5 = 0, alpha6 = 0.2, beta0= 5, betal = 0.8, beta2 = 0.1, beta3 = 0, beta4 = 0, beta5= 0,
beta6 = 0, a = 0, z1 = 1, z2 = 1, taue = 1))
# Parameters of Interest
parameters <- c("alphaO", "alphal", "alpha2", "alpha3", "alpha4", "alpha5", "alpha6", "beta0",
"betal", "beta2", "beta3", "beta4", "beta5", "beta6", "r", "omega.b")
# Paths for OpenBUGS and output files
BUGSpath=".. ./OpenBUGS.exe"
outpath=". . ./NCSC"
# RBUGS simulation
data.sim <- rbugs(data=pd342_data, inits, paramSet=parameters, model="342model.txt",
bugs=BUGSpath, n.chains=1, n.iter-150000, bugsWorkingDir-outpath)
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Below is the OpenBUGS code, invoked in R via the file "342model.txt":
modell
for (i in 1:N)
mul [i] <- b[ID[i],1] + alphal*xl [i] + alpha2*x2[i] + alpha3*x3[i] + alpha4*x4[i] + alpha5*x5[i]
+ alpha6*x6[i];
mu2[i] <- b[ID[i],2]+betal*xl [i]+beta2*x2[i]+beta3*x3[i]+beta4*x4[i]+beta5*x5[i]+
beta6*x6[i];
ones[i] <- 1;
ones[i] - dbern( p[i] );
pl [i] <- phi(-mull ]);
p2[i] <- sqrt(taue)*pow((y[i]+equals(y[i],0)), -1) *exp(-taue*pow(log(y[i]+equals
(y[i],0))-nu2[i],2)/2);
p[i) <- (equals(y[i],O)*pl [i]+(1-equals(y[i],0))*p2[i]*(1-pl[i]))/1000000;
for (i in 1:M)
mu.b[i,1] <- alphaO;
mu.b[i,2] <- beta0;
b[i,1:2] - dmnorm(mu.b[i,1:2], omega.b[1:2,1:2]);
itaue <- 1/taue;
# Adapted from Yang & Berger (1994)
ndl <- max(zl,z2);
nd2 <- min(zl,z2);
v[1,1] <- (1-a*a)*ndl+a*a*nd2;
v[2,2] <- a*a*ndl+(1-a*a)*nd2;
v[1,2] <- a*sqrt(1-a*a)*(nd1-nd2);
v[2,1] <- v[1,2];
r <- v[1,2]/(sqrt(v[1,1])*sqrt(v[2,2]));
omega.b[1,1] <- v[2,2]/(v[1,1]*v[2,2]-v[1,2]*v[2,1]);
omega.b[1,2] <- -v[1,2]/(v[1,1]*v[2,2]-v[1,2]*v[2,1]);
omega.b[2,1] <- omega.b[1,2];
omnega.b[2,2] <- v[1,1]/(v[1,1]*v[2,2]-v[1,2]*v[2,1]);
# Prior distributions
alpha0 - dnorm(-2.0, 1.OE-6);
alphal - dnorn(.3, 1.OE-6);
alpha2 - dnorm(0, 1.OE-6);
alpha3 - dnorm(1.0, 1.OE-6);
alpha4 - dnorm(0, 1.OE-6);
alpha5 - dnorm(0, 1.OE-6);
alpha6 - dnorm(0, 1.OE-6);
beta0 - dnorm(1.0, 10.0);
betal - dnorm(-.35, 10.0);
beta2 - dnorm (0, 1.0);
beta3 -dnorm(0, 10.0);
beta4 - dnorn (0, 10.0);
beta5 - dnorm(0, 10.0);
beta6 - dnorn(.33, 1.0);
# Adapted from Yang & Berger (1994)
a - dunif(-1,1);
zI - dgamna(0.5, 100);
z2 - dganma(0.5, 100);
taue - dganma(1, 0.001);
